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How Home Equity Extraction and Reverse Mortgages  
Affect the Credit Outcomes of Senior Households 
Abstract 
This paper examines how the extraction of home equity, including but not limited to equity 
extracted through reverse mortgages, affects credit outcomes of senior households. We use data 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York/Equifax Consumer Credit Panel, supplemented 
with our unique credit panel dataset of reverse mortgage borrowers. We track credit outcomes 
for seniors who extracted equity through cash-out refinancing, home equity lines of credit or 
home equity loans between 2008 and 2011, and a random sample of nonextractors. We estimate 
differences-in-differences by extraction channel using individual, fixed-effects panel regression. 
We find that seniors extracting equity through reverse mortgages have greater reductions in 
consumer debt, and are less likely to become delinquent or foreclose three years post origination 
relative to other extractors and nonextractors. These effects are greater among households who 
experienced a credit shock within the two years prior to loan origination. To help isolate the 
effect of the extraction channel on credit outcomes, we re-estimate our models with a matched 
sample of consumers at the time of extraction. We find that otherwise similar HECM borrowers 
have larger reductions in credit card debt post-extraction than other equity borrowers and non-
borrowers, with no significant difference in the rates of delinquency on non-housing debt post 
extraction. For HECM borrowers, we find that increased initial withdrawal and increased 
monthly cash flow contribute to the reduction in credit card debt. 
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1 
Introduction 
More than 80 percent of senior households in the U.S. own their home, and nearly half of 
the net worth for the median senior is in the form of home equity.1  Seniors tend to not spend 
down this asset for a variety of reasons. There is some evidence that seniors view the equity in 
their homes as precautionary savings to help buffer future shocks such as medical expenses or 
the death of a spouse, with rates of equity extraction through borrowing or home sale increasing 
after such life events (Benito, 2009; Davidoff, 2010; Nakajima and Telyukova, 2011; Venti and 
Wise, 1990; 2004; Poterba, Venti and Wise, 2011). Senior households who desire to consume 
home equity may be unwilling to sell their homes or may be unable to qualify for or afford an 
additional mortgage, particularly after experiencing a financial shock.  
Reverse mortgages, including the federally insured Home Equity Conversion Mortgage 
(HECM), are designed to address this tradeoff, with limited underwriting and no required 
repayment until the borrower no longer lives in the home. The underlying policy assumption is 
that HECMs can provide seniors with “greater financial security” by providing a vehicle to 
“supplement Social Security, meet unexpected medical expenses, and make home 
improvements” without the monthly carrying costs of a forward mortgage . Following the 
financial crisis, the origination of HECMs increased from 5 percent of all types of home equity 
extractions by seniors in 2006 to 12 percent in 2009 . 
What happens to seniors after they extract home equity through borrowing, particularly 
through a reverse mortgage? How do their financial outcomes change relative to similar seniors 
extracting equity through other channels or seniors unable or unwilling to borrow?  The purpose 
of this analysis is to examine how equity extraction, including but not limited to equity extracted 
                                                        
1 Authors’ calculations using the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances. 
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through HECMs, affected the financial outcomes of seniors both during and after the Great 
Recession.  No prior studies have examined the relationship between equity extraction loans, 
generally, or HECMs, specifically, and senior household financial outcomes.  
We focus on a specific set of financial outcomes—a senior’s use and management of 
credit. We pay particular attention to revolving credit card debt, as distinct from nonhousing 
installment loans. While installment loans are typically used to purchase goods such as 
automobiles or to finance education, prior studies indicate that households fund a substantial 
portion of  their consumption through credit cards, even if they hold money in checking or 
savings accounts (Fulford, 2015; Gross and Souleles, 2002).  This finding is also true for senior 
households. About 90 percent of households over the age of 64 hold a credit card and report 
using a credit card for about 30 percent of their payment transactions (Fulford and Schuh, 2015). 
Among seniors age 70 and older using a credit card, 45 percent do not pay off their balances in 
full each month, indicating a need for liquidity that is met through borrowing on credit cards 
(Fulford and Schuh, 2015). Aside from the amount of debt held by a consumer, we also consider 
the ability of a household to pay their debts as indicated by payment delinquencies and credit 
scores.2   
Using a panel dataset of credit records, we compare credit outcomes of seniors who 
extracted home equity using HECMs to those who extracted home equity using other mortgage 
products and those who did not extract any home equity.  Our primary analysis uses data from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRNBY)/Equifax Consumer Credit Panel (CCP) to 
identify seniors who extracted equity through cash-out refinancing, home equity lines of credit   
                                                        
2 According to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB, 2015), paying bills on time, managing 
debt burdens, and having good credit are considered to be indicators of consumer financial well-being.   
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(HELOCs), or closed-end home equity loans (HELOANs) between 2008 and 2011. As 
reverse mortgages are not reported in consumer credit files, we supplement the CCP dataset with 
our unique reverse mortgage credit panel (RMCP) dataset of HECM borrowers who originated a 
reverse mortgage between 2008 and 2011. In both datasets, we track consumer credit records at 
the individual level for two years prior and three years after extraction. Using the CCP dataset, 
we also follow the credit records for a random sample of seniors not extracting equity during the 
same period.  We supplement the credit analysis with a descriptive comparison of other financial 
outcomes for seniors extracting home equity, as reported on survey data from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) and survey data from about 1,200 senior households in the RMCP 
dataset (see Appendix A).   
For the credit analysis, we first estimate differences-in-differences by extraction channel 
using individual fixed effects panel regression.  We find that seniors extracting equity through 
HECMs have greater reductions in credit card debt three years post origination relative to other 
extractors and nonextractors, and are significantly less likely to become delinquent on debt 
payments or experience foreclosure post-extraction. Subsample regressions indicate that much of 
the reduction in revolving debt and improvement in payment outcomes is concentrated among 
the HECM borrowers who had a credit shock immediately prior to extraction.  Nearly one in four 
HECM borrowers experience a 25-point or more drop in credit score within the two years prior 
to originating the loan. These consumers may be unable to borrow from home equity through 
forward mortgage channels due to underwriting requirements. The HECM relaxes this borrowing 
constraint.   
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As a second component of our analysis, we attempt to isolate the impact of the channel of 
extraction on credit outcomes, as distinct from differences in consumers who select into 
particular products. To do this, we construct a matched sample of HECM borrowers and 
borrowers extracting equity through forward mortgages, as well as a matched sample of 
nonborrowers. The samples are matched on consumer credit profiles at the time of loan 
origination, geography, year of extraction, the amount of prior mortgage debt, and the amount of 
the initial withdrawal (for extractors).  In addition to the amount withdrawn at origination, 
HECM borrowers experience an increase in monthly cash-flow from the reverse mortgage by 
paying off forward mortgage debt, not making any payment on the new loan until termination, 
and/or by receiving tenure or term payments from the loan for a set period of time. This increase 
in cash flow is expected to contribute to a reduction in revolving debt among HECM borrowers 
post extraction. We find that for an initial HECM withdrawal of $10,000, the reduction in credit 
card debt in the first year after extraction is $2,364, which rises by $166 for each additional 
$10,000 withdrawn. Further, for every $100 in additional annuitized monthly cash flow from the 
HECM, credit card debt balances decline by $45 in the first year after extraction. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we describe trends in home equity 
borrowing among senior homeowners, as well as trends in senior credit outcomes in the U.S. 
over the past decade, drawing from the Survey of Consumer Finances and prior literature.  We 
then discuss our data, key variables, and methodology.  We present the results of the credit trend 
analysis, first for a random sample of the population and then for a matched sample of 
consumers. Appendix A includes a supplemental analysis with a descriptive comparison of 
changes in financial outcomes for borrowers and nonborrowers, using the HRS and reverse 
mortgage survey data.   
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Senior Home Equity Extraction and Credit Outcomes: Recent Trends and Prior Literature 
In the U.S., senior homeowners collectively hold nearly six trillion dollars in the equity in 
their homes.3 According to data from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), home 
equity constitutes 55 percent of total net wealth for senior homeowners in bottom quarter of the 
income distribution (Table 1). Senior homeowners with household incomes of about $40,000 per 
year (seniors’ median income in 2013) held an average of $127,900 in home equity. This is 
slightly higher than the average of $125,300 in financial assets held by the same households.4    
Table 1: Financial Characteristics for Homeowners over the age of 62 (2013 SCF) 
Income 
Decile Income Assts 
Financial 
Assets 
Home 
Equity Net Worth 
Home Equity as % 
of Net Worth 
 0-9.9 10,054 341,381 95,932 121,018 321,729 37.6% 
 10-19.9 17,453 211,629 50,872 102,810 194,964 52.7% 
 20-29.9 24,727 307,228 80,602 157,047 283,390 55.4% 
 30-39.9 32,795 267,670 88,303 118,270 237,533 49.8% 
 40-49.9 41,425 347,984 125,304 127,900 293,702 43.5% 
 50-59.9 52,904 478,292 208,548 148,130 418,214 35.4% 
 60-69.9 67,869 589,390 231,957 174,877 517,733 33.8% 
 70-79.9 89,620 1,019,148 489,703 238,396 943,874 25.3% 
 80-89.9 124,060 1,426,192 685,576 301,712 1,306,828 23.1% 
 90-94.9 187,183 1,993,239 1,158,184 299,297 1,851,258 16.2% 
 95-98.9 363,136 5,592,915 2,983,082 689,167 5,356,747 12.9% 
 99-100 1,619,041 20,700,000 10,400,000 1,575,398 20,300,000 7.8% 
Source: Author's calculations from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances, weighted means 
  
                                                        
3 Authors calculations from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 
4 Financial assets are defined by the SCF to include liquid assets, certificates of deposit, directly held 
pooled investment funds, stocks, bonds, quasi-liquid assets, savings bonds, whole life insurance, other 
managed assets, and other financial assets. 
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The amount of home equity held by senior homeowners has varied over time, 
corresponding to changes in the housing market associated with the Great Recession.  Figure 1 
shows a large increase in 2013 constant dollar average home equity from approximately 
$150,000 in 1989 to a peak of $292,000 in 2007 just before the recession began. Post-recession, 
average home equity levels dropped to their 2001 level by 2013. In addition to changes in house 
values, the average mortgage debt among senior homeowners has seen a steady incline from 
about $15,000 in 1995 to a 2010 peak of $52,000, followed by a minor decrease. 
Figure 1: Home Equity, Mortgage Debt, and House Value for Homeowners Age 62+  
Mean Values by Year (2013 Constant Dollars) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from the Survey of Consumer Finances 
The SCF shows that other types of debt have followed trends similar to mortgage debt 
over time. Figure 2 shows that real installment debts spiked in 2004 and remained about $2,000 
higher from 2007-2013 than it was during the late 1990s. The average credit card balance 
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roughly doubled since the 1990s. However, between 2007 and 2013, credit card debt fell by 17 
percent, the same decrease as for mortgage debt.5 The interplay between various types of debt 
highlights the importance of focusing on a household’s overall debt portfolio, as changes in 
housing and credit markets may prompt substitution of one debt type for another.      
Figure 2: Mean Debt Amounts  for Homeowners Age 62+ By Debt Type, Year  
(2013 Constant Dollars) 
  
Source: Author’s calculations from the Survey of Consumer Finances 
Home equity can be tapped by various means, including refinancing a first mortgage, a 
closed-end home equity loan or a home equity loan or line of credit (HELOC), selling the home, 
or a reverse mortgage.  Forward mortgages require periodic repayments and the household must 
be sufficiently credit worthy and have a sufficient flow of income to qualify for the loan. Reverse                                                         
5 Balances on mortgage and consumer debts may decrease because borrowers pay down debts, or due to 
bankruptcy, creditor charge-offs of delinquent accounts, or for mortgages due to foreclosures.   
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mortgages require no monthly repayment and have historically lacked credit-based underwriting 
criteria, making the loan accessible to borrowers with limited cash-flow and weaker credit 
profiles.6  Alternatively, selling the home can be a way to access equity if the household 
subsequently rents, purchases a lower valued home (with a similar loan-to-value ratio), or 
purchases a similarly priced home with a higher loan to value ratio. However, relocation may be 
nonoptimal for seniors who have a strong desire to stay in their homes. Survey data indicates that 
63 percent of homeowners age 55 and older and 70 percent of retired homeowners would like to 
remain in their current residence for the rest of their lives (Freddie Mac, 2016).     
Prior research on home equity extraction among seniors tends to focus on either equity 
extraction generally , or specific borrowing channels such as the use of reverse mortgages . 
Recent research using credit data merged with data on HECMs finds that from 2004-2012, 
approximately 60 percent of new equity extraction loans originated by seniors were in the form 
of HELOCs, 19 percent were structured as cash-out refinancing, 16 percent as HELOANS, and 5 
percent as HECMs  .   
One of the main findings from prior studies on equity extraction is that senior 
homeowners tend to not spend down housing wealth in retirement, as would be expected from 
the life-cycle model of consumption (e.g. Modigliani and Brumberg ,1954). Instead, equity 
extraction tends to occur after the senior household experiences a shock to their health, familial 
status or finances (Benito, 2009; Davidoff, 2010; Nakajima and Telyukova, 2011; Venti and 
Wise, 1990; 2004; Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 2011; Megbolugbe, Sa-Aadu, and Shilling, 1997).  
                                                        
6 Historically, HUD has not imposed risk-based underwriting criteria (e.g., related to credit score, debt, or 
income). Eligibility for a HECM was based primarily on the borrower’s age and residency requirements. 
However, beginning in April 2015, HUD required lenders to assess and document a borrower’s “ability to 
pay” before originating a loan, following minimum credit, debt, and affordability standards (Mortgagee 
Letter, 2013-28; Mortgagee Letter, 2014-22; Mortgagee Letter, 2015-06). 
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These studies tend to rely on survey data to measure shocks to a household, such as death of a 
family member, loss of a job, or changes in health status.  
Rather than analyzing equity extraction through borrowing, prior studies tend to focus on 
senior extraction of equity through home sale, as the proportion of seniors holding mortgage debt 
has historically been low (although this trend is changing as noted above).   Our study 
contributes to this literature by focusing on senior equity extraction through borrowing, using 
credit data rather than survey data. Unlike prior studies, our purpose is not to predict equity 
extraction, but rather to explore the relationship between home equity borrowing and other credit 
outcomes, as moderated by the borrowing channel.  
With regard to credit outcomes, prior research indicates a high degree of volatility in both 
the supply and demand for credit in the periods prior to and after the Great Recession (Brown et 
al., 2010; Fulford, 2015). This volatility influences the amount of debt held by households, as 
well changes in the composition of debt (Brown et al., 2015) and the extent to which borrowers 
meet their payment obligations (Brown et al., 2010; Bhutta and Keys, 2016).  Using the 
FRBNY/Equifax CCP data, Brown et al. (2010) report an overall increase in consumer debt from 
1999 to 2008, with a decline through 2010. They conclude the decline in debt is due both to a 
change in consumer behavior (demanding less debt) and to changes in lender supply of credit, 
where from 2008 to 2010, lenders reduced credit limits on credit cards by 28 percent and on 
HELOCs by 12 percent. Fulford (2015) estimates that credit card limits continued to decline 
through 2013.7 To reduce their outstanding liabilities, lenders also initiated account closures in 
2008 following the financial crisis with the number of open credit card accounts held by 
consumers remaining at the post-2008 levels through 2013. This is relevant to our study in that                                                         
7 He finds that volatility in credit limits is greater than the volatility in household income, and that credit 
limit volatility contributes to variation in consumption.  
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we are tracking credit outcomes for seniors during this period of credit supply volatility, from 
2006 to 2014.   
Home equity borrowing may affect credit outcomes by serving as a substitute for other 
types of consumer debt. For example, homeowners may substitute less expensive mortgage debt 
for more expensive credit card debt when the housing market is favorable, and turn back to credit 
card debt when house prices decline. Using the FRBNY/Equifax CCP data from 1999-2012, 
Brown et al. (2015) find evidence of substitution, particularly among prime homeowners (with 
credit scores greater than 700) and older homeowners (older than 55).8 Homeowners may also 
use a portion of extracted equity to pay down other consumer debts, with prior studies estimating 
about 10 percent of extracted equity is used for this purpose (Bhutta and Keys, 2016; Greenspan 
and Kennedy, 2008; Hurst and Stafford, 2004; Cooper 2010).  
Home equity borrowing may affect not only the amount and composition of debt held by 
a household, but also the ability to meet debt payment obligations. There is a large body of 
literature that analyzes the relationship between home equity extraction and mortgage default. 
These studies tend to find that homeowners extracting equity during the boom in house prices 
from 2004 to 2006 often ended up in a negative equity situation in subsequent years that placed 
them at increased risk for foreclosure (e.g. Bhutta and Keys, 2016; LaCour-Little et al., 2014; 
Mian and Sufi, 2011). Most closely related to our analysis, Bhutta and Keys (2016) analyze 
households who extracted home equity from 1999 to 2008 using the FRBNY/Equifax CCP data. 
While the primary focus of their study is to explore the decision to extract equity in response to 
changes in the macro-economy, they also estimate the probability of default on mortgage and   
                                                        
8 As house prices declined from 2007 to 2012, they find HELOC debt declined by an amount slightly less 
than the increase in the amount of nonhousing debt held by these homeowning households. 
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nonmortgage debt in the four years following equity extraction.  They find that households 
extracting equity in 2006 were 90 percent more likely to become delinquent on mortgage debt 
than other homeowners and 40 percent more likely to become delinquent on nonmortgage debt 
than other homeowners during the same period.   
Our study contributes to this prior literature by focusing home equity borrowing of senior 
homeowners and subsequent credit outcomes, including both changes in credit card and 
nonhousing installment debt levels as well as changes in debt payment delinquencies. Similar to 
other studies reviewed here (Brown et al., 2010; 2015; Fulford et al., 2015; Bhutta and Keys, 
2016), we use the FRBNY/Equifax CCP data to track credit outcomes and to identify forward 
mortgage home equity extractions. Unlike Brown et al. (2015), we do not limit home equity 
borrowing channels to HELOCs, but also identify closed-end HELOANS and cash-out 
refinancing of existing first liens, following the strategy used by Bhutta and Keys (2016). Unique 
to our study, we also trace credit outcomes for HECM reverse mortgages borrowers.9    
Data and Variables  
The paper uses two primary datasets.  The first dataset is the FRBNY/Equifax CCP data. 
The CCP is a panel dataset that begins in the first quarter of 1999 and is updated quarterly, with 
approximately 40 million credit files each quarter. Our CCP sample covers the years 2006 
through 2014, and is limited to senior households over the age of 62 during our study period. The 
second dataset is the authors’ proprietary reverse mortgage credit panel (RMCP) on a sample of 
more than 30,000 homeowners considering reverse mortgages from 2006 to 2011 with annual   
                                                        
9 Reverse mortgages are not typically reported to credit bureaus until they are terminated, and thus prior 
studies cannot identify reverse mortgages by using credit report data alone. We are able to address this 
deficiency with our unique credit panel data on reverse mortgage borrowers. 
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credit updates through 2014, linked to data from HUD on HECM loan originations. Like the 
CCP dataset, the RMCP dataset follows the same individuals over time, and includes similar 
consumer credit report attributes from Equifax credit reports.   Both credit panel datasets include 
information on individuals’ consumer and mortgage debt holdings, payment histories, credit 
scores (the Equifax risk score), and geographic location (census tract and ZIP code).  
In the CCP, we define extractors as those originating a new equity extraction loan 
between any two quarters of the CCP from 2008-2011.10 Cash-out refinance originations are 
defined as those whose first mortgage balance increases by at least $1,000 or 5 percent of the 
total first mortgage balance from the prior quarter, and whose combined mortgage balance 
increases by at least the same amount (thus excluding consolidation mortgages).11 Home equity 
loan originations are defined as those whose installment loan balance increases by at least $1,000 
or 5 percent of the total balance of installment loans on the credit report from the prior quarter. 
HELOC originations are determined by the creation of a new HELOC trade line account as 
specified by the opening date in the credit file. For this analysis, we code as HELOC borrowers 
those consumers who originate a new HELOC and extract equity at the time of origination, as 
                                                        
10 We are defining extraction at a single point in time (baseline year). While mortgage activity could 
occur after the baseline year, our analysis is estimating the effect of the extraction that occurred in the 
baseline year on credit outcomes. We do not model subsequent mortgage activity after the baseline year 
that could also affect credit outcomes. 
11 We exclude households from the sample whose first mortgage balance increased by $1,000 or more 
from one quarter to the next, but who are also 90+ days past due on their forward mortgage in either 
quarter. It is likely that these consumers have an increase in their mortgage balances due to default and/or 
loan modification (which were common during the 2008-2011 sample period), not cash-out refinancing. It 
would be very unlikely that a household in default on their first mortgage would be able to refinance and 
extract additional equity. This restriction excludes about 8,000 consumers from the dataset. 
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indicated by a positive balance on the HELOC.12 In the RMCP dataset, HECM originations are 
identified by the closing date for the HECM origination.  
We further limit our sample to those in the CCP who do not appear to be investors, that 
is, those with fewer than three installment loans or first mortgages and fewer than three HELOC 
accounts. To exclude mortgages originated to purchase a new principal residence, we exclude 
consumers that changed census blocks from the quarter prior to loan origination. Finally, we 
limit the CCP sample to those consumers residing in similar geographic areas to the HECM 
borrowers in the RMCP dataset.13 
Using these definitions, we identify 74,603 senior equity extractors in the CCP from 2008 
to 2011, of whom 37 percent originated a HELOC, 36 percent cash-out refinanced a first 
mortgage, and 27 percent originated a closed end home equity loan. We also generate a random 
sample of 80,000 nonextractors, or 20,000 per year from 2008 to 2011.  We combine this dataset 
from the CCP with our RMCP dataset of 13,666 households. For the regression analysis, we drop 
individuals with missing or extremely large values for credit outcomes or equity extraction 
amounts, and individuals lacking three consecutive years of credit data, resulting in 157,680 
unique individuals.14 We follow each individual on an annual basis from the quarter of 
origination in the credit panel dataset for two years prior to loan origination (baseline) and three 
                                                        
12 Approximately half of the senior consumers in the CCP dataset originate a HELOC but do not have 
positive balance in the period after origination, indicating that they did not extract equity at the time of 
origination. For our primary specification, we treat these consumers as missing from the sample. In 
alternative specifications we include these individuals as HELOC borrowers, with no substantial change 
in our results. 
13 We define geographic area using the 3-digit ZIP code, and include CCP consumers residing in a 3 digit 
ZIP code that matches a HECM borrower in our sample. This restriction results in 25,771 ZIP codes, 
comprising 60 percent of U.S. ZIP codes with 92 percent of the U.S. population.   
14 Extremely large values are defined as open credit card balances greater than $50,000, open (non-
mortgage) installment balances greater than $500,000 and initial withdrawal amounts greater than 
$500,000.   
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years after loan origination—up to six years total for a given individual or loan origination, 
resulting in more than 700,000 observations during our sample period.15 Because nonextractors 
do not have a quarter of extraction, they are randomly assigned a quarter from which their yearly 
observations are drawn. 
From the credit panel data, we identify five credit outcomes: credit card balance, non-
mortgage installment loan balance, credit score (the Equifax risk score), whether or not the 
consumer has any tradeline that is 60 days or more past due as of the time of the credit report, 
and whether or not the consumer has any mortgage with a foreclosure on file.16 Summary 
statistics are reported in Table 2, first for the overall sample and then by extraction channel.  All 
dollar amounts are deflated to constant dollar values for 2006. 
                                                        
15 For some observations, we have fewer than six years of data due to death or attrition from the credit 
panel dataset.  In addition, as households exit the CCP, new individuals are randomly added; thus, for 
newly added consumers we may be missing data for two full years prior to loan origination.  For all 
observations, we have at least three consecutive years of data (including the baseline period). 
16 Credit scores are the proprietary Equifax credit scores that range from 250 to 850. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics, at Loan Origination or Baseline Period 
  
Full sample 
(n=157,680)1 
HECM 
(n=12,464) 
HELOC 
(n=25,753) 
CASH-OUT 
(n=24,728) 
HELOAN 
(n=18,968) 
Non-
Extract 
(n=75,767) 
  
  
Mean  
(SD) Median 
Mean  
(SD) 
Mean  
(SD)   
Mean  
(SD)   
Mean  
(SD)   
Mean  
(SD)     
Credit outcomes 
  
  
   
  
    
  
Credit card balance  $4,452 $749 $7,647 $5,891 *** $5,616 *** $6,673 *** $2,504 ***   
 
(8,764) 
 
(11,693) (9,715) 
 
(9,472) 
 
(10,284) 
 
(6,457) 
 
  
Installment loan balance  $6,655 $0 $6,099 $7,880 *** $10,329 *** $11,449 *** $3,930 ***   
 
(20,867) 
 
(18,841) (22,022) 
 
(27,189) 
 
(27,005) 
 
(15,523) 
 
  
Equifax risk score 750 780 696 776 *** 752 *** 741 *** 751 ***   
 
(82.56) 
 
(97.73) (49.16) 
 
(79.92) 
 
(84.93) 
 
(84.63) 
 
  
Any >60 days past due  0.108 
 
0.250 0.024 *** 0.095 *** 0.118 *** 0.115 ***   
 
(0.310) 
 
(0.433) (0.153) 
 
(0.294) 
 
(0.323) 
 
(0.319) 
 
  
Any foreclosure on file 0.008 
 
0.001 0.000 *** 0.785 *** 0.020 *** 0.008 ***   
  (0.089)   (0.038) (0.019)   (0.088)   (0.141)   (0.092)     
Other variables 
  
  
        
  
Initial extraction amount 
(ten thousands) $2.96 $0.12 $4.81 $3.69 *** $9.20 *** $4.40 *** $0.00 ***   
  (5.85)   (5.58) (5.16) 
 
(9.28) 
 
(4.96) 
   
  
Mortgage balance  $64,660 $9,182 $62,769 $78,189 *** $153,168 *** $85,361 *** $26,303 ***   
 
(120,169)   (109,150) (137,276) 
 
(151,862) 
 
(114,156) 
 
(81,854) 
 
  
% with mortgage at
baseline 0.53   0.57 0.67 
 
1.00 
 
0.88 
 
0.23 
 
  
Δ risk score (2 yrs prior)  1.01 2.00 -12.21 1.83 *** 1.68 *** -0.95 *** 3.45 ***   
 
(46.66)   (62.00) (33.08) 
 
(45.05) 
 
(51.39) 
 
(46.02) 
 
  
% with a credit shock  0.170 0.000 0.289 0.142 *** 0.178 *** 0.188 *** 0.151 ***   
 
(0.376)   (0.453) (0.349) 
 
(0.383) 
 
(0.391) 
 
(0.358) 
 
  
Age of borrower 71.12 69.00 71.86 69.08 *** 68.03 *** 68.47 *** 73.36 ***   
 
(8.79)   (7.38) (7.24) 
 
(7.05) 
 
(7.07) 
 
(9.69) 
 
  
Origination year, 2008 0.271 
 
0.148 0.374 *** 0.242 *** 0.331 *** 0.250 ***   
Origination year, 2009 0.229 
 
0.143 0.219 *** 0.232 *** 0.212 *** 0.250 ***   
Origination year, 2010 0.254 
 
0.383 0.201 *** 0.266 *** 0.249 *** 0.249 ***   
Origination year, 2011 0.246   0.327 0.205 *** 0.260 *** 0.208 *** 0.251 ***   
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
         
  1Summary statistics and sample size correspond to observations for the baseline period. Some individuals are missing observations 
for the two years prior to baseline, and thus the sample size for the credit shock and change in credit score two years prior to 
baseline is Withdrawal <$10ker (n=134,003)   
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There are noticeable differences between HECM borrowers and other types of extractors, 
as well as between extractors and nonextractors. Across all channels, those extracting home 
equity tend to have larger credit card and installment loan balances than nonextractors. HECM 
borrowers also tend to have higher credit card balances at baseline than extractors and 
nonextractors, but lower installment balances relative to other extractors. At the time of loan 
origination, HECM borrowers have much lower credit scores on average than other seniors, both 
extractors and nonextractors. In addition, HECM borrowers are more likely to be past due on any 
trade-line and to have a foreclosure on file at the time of loan origination.   
HECM borrowers are also twice as likely to have experienced a drop in credit score 
within the two years prior to loan origination, which we label a “credit shock.  Overall, nearly 30 
percent of HECM borrowers experienced a drop in their credit score of greater than 25 points in 
the two years prior to baseline, compared to 14 to 19 percent for other extraction channels, and 
15 percent of nonextractors. The average HECM borrower had a drop in credit score of 12 
points, whereas for other extraction channels, the average borrower’s credit stayed the same or 
increased slightly in the two years prior to extraction. Seniors with compromised credit or prior 
credit shocks who desire to extract equity may be unable to qualify for forward mortgages, but 
were able to qualify for a HECM. During the sample period (2008-2011), there was no credit 
based underwriting criteria for origination a HECM.17    
In alternative specifications, we model the initial extraction amount in addition to the 
channel of extraction. The initial extraction amount is defined as the amount extracted above and 
                                                        
17 Historically, HUD has not imposed risk-based underwriting criteria (e.g., related to credit score, debt, 
or income). Eligibility for a HECM was based primarily on the borrower’s age and residency 
requirements.  However, beginning in April 2015, HUD requires lenders to assess and document a 
borrower’s “ability to pay” before originating a loan, following minimum credit, debt and affordability 
standards (Mortgagee Letter 2013-28; Mortgagee Letter 2014-22; Mortgagee Letter 2015-06). 
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beyond existing mortgage balances (for forward extraction loans) or after paying off forward 
mortgage balances (for HECMs). For a HECM borrower, the average pay-off was $62,769 in 
prior mortgages, and the average extraction equaled an additional $48,122.  HELOC borrowers 
tend to extract a smaller amount, on average, while those cash-out refinancing a first mortgage 
tend to extract the most.  With regard to prior mortgage balances at the time of origination, 
HECM borrowers have significantly higher balances than nonextractors (which includes non-
homeowners and those who own their homes outright), but smaller balances than seniors 
extracting equity through other channels.  
In addition to the amount extracted at origination, we also estimate a set of models that 
include the amount of monthly cash that results from the HECM.  HECM borrowers face a 
requirement to payoff forward mortgage debt with the proceeds of the HECM, this frees up cash 
flow that would otherwise be used to make their forward mortgage payment. On credit report 
data, we observe the amount of the monthly mortgage payment in the period prior to originating 
the HECM, with an average monthly amount of $520 (including those with no prior mortgage).  
In addition, about 5 percent of HECM borrowers in our sample structured their HECM to receive 
monthly payments from the equity for a set period of time (term) or until loan termination 
(tenure). The average amount of a monthly payment is about $1,500 for those receiving monthly 
payments. When averaged across all HECM borrowers, this amount equals about $40 per month. 
We measure monthly cash from the HECM as the sum of the prior monthly mortgage payment 
and the tenure or term payments from the HECM.     
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Empirical Models  
We estimate the impact of equity extraction by channel on credit outcomes using an 
individual, fixed-effects panel regression:  
 
(1)   yit = ai + θPriort + λPostt + ϕ�Channelijt ∗ Priort�+ δ�Channelijt ∗ Postt�+
βjxit + εit 
 
where yit is a particular credit outcome for consumer (i) at time (t). The baseline period 
for each consumer is omitted from the analysis, and is defined as the quarter immediately before 
origination for those originating an equity extraction loan. We include an indicator, “Prior”, 
coded as 1 for the observations that occur during the two years prior to baseline or 0 otherwise 
and thus θ measures the average difference in the outcome from two year prior to extraction to 
the baseline period. Post is coded as 1 if the observation occurs after the extraction (baseline) 
period, and λ measures the average change in the outcome across the three years after extraction.  
The interaction coefficient 𝜙𝜙 measures the difference in the outcome for given channel (j) of 
extraction prior to extraction. The interaction coefficient δ can be interpreted as the differences-
in-differences estimate for a given channel (j) of extraction after extraction and it is the key 
coefficient of interest.18 Each model includes a vector of controls for time varying borrower age 
and year, measured by β, and an error term for each individual and year, εit. Year fixed effects 
are included to absorb changes in the macro-economy over time, including supply-side factors 
                                                        
18 This is the effect of the extraction that occurs in the baseline period on outcomes for three years post 
extraction. It is possible that other mortgage activity (such as subsequent extractions) occur after the 
baseline period. To the extent that this varies systematically by channel, this effect also would be picked 
up by the interaction term. 
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that may affect credit availability and account balances (e.g., due to charge-offs or account 
closures). 
In alternative specifications to the base model, we measure each year of the post period 
(and their interactions) separately for the three years following extraction (baseline), in addition 
to the measure for the pre period. This allows us to track the evolution of credit outcomes over 
time throughout the post period. We also estimate the model separately for those with and 
without a credit shock, allowing all of the model parameters to vary for the respective 
subsamples, as consumers with credit shocks may respond differently to different channels of 
extraction. 
Our primary identification strategy is differences-in-differences estimation, comparing 
differences within the same individuals over time by channel of extraction, relative to those not 
extracting equity.  We also control for observable time varying characteristics that may influence 
credit outcomes, including the age of the senior and the calendar year of the observation period. 
It is possible that unobserved differences among seniors may influence the likelihood of 
extraction through a particular channel, and these differences may be correlated with the credit 
outcomes. To account for this, we include individual fixed effects. However, individual fixed 
effects only account for time invariant unobserved characteristics between individuals. There 
may still be unobserved differences between individuals that vary over time or interact with the 
channel of extraction to effect credit outcomes.  
To better isolate the relationship between the channel of extraction and credit outcomes, 
we construct a matched sample of observations using coarsened exact matching (CEM). We then 
re-estimate the individual fixed effects models using the matched sample.  While CEM only 
matches on observable characteristics, the CEM approach assumes that some of the unobservable 
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characteristics that may affect credit outcomes are correlated with the observed characteristics 
used for matching.  We use the k2k match procedure (Blackwell et al., 2009). For each HECM 
observation, we use CEM to identify two matched observations in the CCP dataset: a household 
with a new forward equity extraction (HELOC, cash-out refinance, or closed-end home equity 
loan) during the observation period; and a senior household with no new equity extraction during 
the observation period.  We treat the baseline period for matching in the RMCP and CCP sample 
(time t) as the quarter immediately prior to the equity extraction.   
For the CEM, we match characteristics in the CCP and RMCP datasets at time t, 
including the date (quarter and year) of origination, three digit ZIP Code, credit score, the 
mortgage balance at baseline, an indicator for mortgage payment delinquency, and the amount of 
the initial withdrawal for extractors.19  For the HECM to extractor match, the CEM procedure is 
able to identify a matched observation for 34 percent of the HECM borrowers in our sample. 
This indicates that only about one-third of the HECM borrowers in our sample have 
characteristics that would also be observed among seniors extracting equity through other 
borrowing channels who are in the CCP sample (of about 75,000 equity extractors). For the 
HECM to nonextractor match, the CEM procedure generates a match for 98 percent of the 
HECM borrowers. Part of the reason for the higher match rate is the larger pool of nonextractors 
from which a match can be generated. For the HECM to nonextractor match, we do not limit the 
match pool to the 80,000 randomly selected nonextractors used in the initial regression, but 
                                                        
19 For credit score, we coarsen the match based on the following credit buckets: <300, 300-619, 620-719, 
720-849, and 850+. Mortgage delinquency is an exact match, measured by an indicator for whether or not 
the consumer was 60 days or more delinquent on their mortgage in the quarter prior to baseline. For 
mortgage amount and the initial withdrawal amount, we coarsen the match based on the following 
buckets: $0; $1-$49,999; $50,000-$149,999; $150,000-$1,000,000).   
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instead use the entire CCP dataset of nonextractors age 62 and older, which includes more than 
two million observations during our sample period.  
For the analysis, we retain only those HECM observations with a match to the extractor 
sample, and the nonextractors who are linked to those HECM observations. We include the same 
restrictions applied to the full sample of CCP observations, resulting in a final dataset of 15,311 
individuals, including 5,472 HECM borrowers, 4,422 CCP extractors and 5,417 CCP 
nonextractors.20  Table 3 provides summary statistics for the matched samples.   
  
                                                        
20 The HECM/nonextractor match does not include the initial withdrawal amount as part of the match 
criteria, so there are fewer unique strata generated for the HECM/nonextractor match than the 
HECM/extractor match. Thus, for a single HECM/extractor matched set of observations, we may have 
multiple HECM/nonextractor matched sets identified. This results in a slightly larger sample size for the 
HECM and nonextractor observations than the extractor observations.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Matched Sample, at Loan Origination or Baseline Period 
HECM 
(n=5,472) 
Any Extract 
(n=4,422) 
HELOC 
(n=1,428) 
CASH-OUT 
(n=1,735) 
HELOAN 
(n=1,259) 
Non-Extract 
(n=5,417) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Credit outcomes 
   Credit card balance  $8,251 $6,019 *** $6,179 *** $5,083 *** $7,126 ** $5,218 *** 
(11,745) (9,517) 
 
(9,375) (8,562)
 
(10,728) (9,508) 
Installment loan balance  $6,805 $9,359 *** $7,951 ** $9,849 *** $10,279 *** $7,147
(19,745) (24,054) 
 
(19,263) 
 
(30,126) 
 
(18,922)  (19,837) 
 Equifax risk score 723 745 *** 768 *** 741 *** 723 733 *** 
(81.97) (81.17) 
 
(55.50) 
 
(85.69) (91.75) (91.75) 
Any >60 days past due  0.140 0.105 *** 0.041 *** 0.116 ** 0.164 ** 0.162 **
(0.347) (0.307) 
 
(0.197) (0.320) 
 
(0.370) (0.368) 
 Any foreclosure on file 0.001 0.017 *** 0.000 0.018 *** 0.036 *** 0.019 *** 
 (0.030) (0.130) (0.000) (0.133) (0.186) (0.136) 
Other variables 
   
Initial extraction amount (ten 
thousands) $3.99 $4.43 *** $3.09 *** $5.96 *** $3.84 $0.00 *** 
(4.90) (5.62) (4.24)
 
(7.14)
 
(3.82)
 Mortgage balance  $103,790 $106,613 $88,611 *** $133,925 *** $89,394 *** $112,853 *** 
(114,502) (112,089) (100,354) (112,228)
% with a mortgage at baseline 1.00 0.89 0.75 1.00 0.90 1.00 
    
Δ Equifax risk score (2 yrs 
prior)  -5.85 0.43 *** 2.01 *** 1.22 *** -2.53 * -1.08 *** 
 (52.45) (48.04) 
 
(36.09) 
 
(48.33) 
 
(58.48) (56.20) 
 % with a credit shock  0.239 0.185 *** 0.151 *** 0.192 *** 0.215 0.199 *** 
 (0.426) (0.388) 
 
(0.358) 
 
(0.394) 
 
(0.411) (0.400) 
 Age of borrower 71.49 68.73 *** 69.02 *** 68.33 *** 68.94 *** 70.71 *** 
(6.99) (7.23) (7.47) (6.85)
 
(7.46) (7.62)
 Origination year, 2008 0.186 0.166 ** 0.209 * 0.124 *** 0.172 0.155 *** 
Origination year, 2009 0.147 0.146 
 
0.140 
 
0.172 ** 0.115 *** 0.152
 Origination year, 2010 0.388 0.353 *** 0.306 *** 0.364 * 0.391 0.349 *** 
Origination year, 2011 0.280 0.336 *** 0.345 *** 0.339 *** 0.322 ** 0.343 *** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(101,862) (111,836)
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Ideally, the CEM procedure would reduce the imbalance on observable characteristics 
between the HECM sample and the CCP samples.  While there are still statistically significant 
differences between the HECM samples and CCP samples (Table 3), the magnitude of these 
differences has been substantially reduced relative to those in the random sample comparisons 
(Table 2).  
Using the matched sample, we re-estimate the same models specified in equation (1) for 
each credit outcome.  We also estimate a specification that includes the amount of the initial 
extraction by channel (and their interactions) in addition to the channel of extraction. This allows 
us to separate the effect of originating a loan through a particular channel and the dollar amount 
of equity extracted as we might expect the intensity of equity extraction to have a different effect 
than origination.  In the amount specification, we also include the amount of monthly cash 
generated from the HECM (which is $0 for HECM borrowers in the period prior to extraction). 
This allows us to explore any added impact of additional monthly cash flow from the HECM on 
credit outcomes.   
Results   
Descriptive Credit Trends 
Prior to presenting the regression results, we graph the trends over time for each of the 
five credit outcomes, by extraction channel. We first graph the trends for the full random sample 
(Figures 3.1-3.5). There are notable differences in credit trends. With regard to credit card 
balances (Figure 3.1), HECM borrowers see a sharp increase prior to extraction, and then a 
substantial drop and leveling off after extraction, in line with increased demand for liquidity that 
is met through credit card use and then substituted with home equity after the origination of the 
HECM.  By contrast, other equity extractors tend to have declining or flat revolving credit 
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balances prior to extraction, that then drop off slightly after extraction. This pattern of paying 
down debt prior to (and after) extraction is observed for installment loan balances as well (Figure 
3.2). Unlike the pre-extraction spike in revolving credit card balances, installment loan balances 
decline for HECM borrowers before and after extraction.    
With regard to credit score (Figure 3.3) HECM borrowers are more likely to undergo a 
credit shock prior to extraction, and then recover from the shock after extraction. Other seniors 
tend to have higher and relatively flat credit score trends before and after extraction. In an 
analysis of credit trends over the life cycle, Fulford and Schuh (2015) find that credit scores 
increase gradually as people age, this matching the trend we observe for nonextractors in our 
sample. The credit shock for HECM borrowers is also evident in a spike in past due trade lines 
(Figure 3.4) prior to extraction, that declines immediately after extraction and then begins to rise 
again over time. Seniors extracting equity through cash-out refinancing exhibit the reverse trend, 
with a slight decline in past due accounts prior to extraction and an increase that begins 
immediately thereafter. The spike in delinquency after extraction is even more pronounced for 
foreclosures on mortgage debt (Figure 3.5), where cash-out refinancing is associated with a stark 
increase in foreclosure rates each year after extraction. By contrast, the rate of foreclosures 
among HECM borrowers declines with extraction and remains low for the three years following 
extraction.     
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Figure 3.1 Credit Card Balances 
       
Figure 3.2 Nonhousing Installment Loans 
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Figure 3.3 Equifax Risk Score 
 
Figure 3.4 Past Due any Tradelines 
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Figure 3.5 % with Foreclosure on Credit File 
 
Figures 4.1-4.5 graph the same credit trends, but this time for the matched samples 
generated through the  
CEM procedure. Even with the more restrictive matched sample, we observe an increase 
in credit card balances at the time of extraction for HECM borrowers (Figure 4.1) that 
substantially declines in the period after extraction, a trend that is not observed for other 
extractors. However, HECM borrowers in the matched sample do not have as noticeable of a 
drop in credit score prior to extraction as the full sample of HECM borrowers (Figure 4.3 relative 
to Figure 3.3), and the credit score remains relatively flat after extraction (Figure 4.3). This 
indicates that HECM borrowers with a credit shock were less likely to find a comparable match 
in the sample of forward mortgage extractors, and those finding a match were less likely to have 
had a credit shock. With regard to payment delinquencies, the matched sample of HECM 
borrowers have a steady increase in the likelihood of being past due on a payment from the 
period prior to the period after extraction, this being different than the trend observed for the full 
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sample of HECM borrowers (Figure 4.4 relative to Figure 3.4).  The other credit trends are 
relatively similar between the unmatched and matched samples. 
Figure 4.1 Credit Card Balances 
 
Figure 4.2 Nonhousing Installment Loans 
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Figure 4.3 Equifax Risk Score 
 
Figure 4.4 Past Due any Tradelines 
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Figure 4.5 % with Foreclosure on Credit File 
 
Full Sample Regression Results 
Table 4 presents the results of the fixed-effects panel regression specified in equation (1) 
for each of the five credit outcomes. The interaction coefficients for each channel of extraction 
and the after period can be interpreted as the differences-in-differences for a change in credit 
outcomes post extraction by channel, where the reference category is nonextractors. The before 
period interactions are the differences by channel two years prior to extraction (or baseline) 
relative to the baseline period. 
The regression results confirm the descriptive trends.  HECM borrowers have 
significantly larger reductions in credit card balances post extraction relative to nonextractors 
and other extractors. Post extraction, HECM borrower credit balances are more than $3,000 
lower than balances at baseline. Installment balances are also significantly lower for HECM 
borrowers relative to nonextractors, cash-out refinancing and HELOC borrowers. HELOAN 
extractors have the greatest reduction in installment balances relative to other seniors.  
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Aside from changes in debt balances, HECM borrowers have about a five-point increase in credit 
score after extraction, relative to very little change (or decrease) for seniors extracting equity through 
other channels.  HECM borrowers are also the only channel of extractors who are significantly less 
likely to be delinquent on trade-lines post-extraction; all other channels of extractors have an increased 
rate of delinquency relative to nonextractors. Seniors extracting equity through cash-out refinancing and 
HELOANS also have higher rates of foreclosure post-extraction relative to nonextractors.  HELOC and 
HECM borrowers, by contrast, do not have significantly higher rates of foreclosure. This adds nuance to 
the Bhutta and Keys (2016) finding that extractors have higher rates of default and foreclosure. Our 
results indicate that changes in default rates differ by channel of extraction.    
Table 4: Differences-in-Differences, Full Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Credit 
Card Bal. 
Installment 
Balance 
Equifax 
Risk Score 
Past Due 
(any) Foreclosure 
            
Prior to baseline (2 yrs) -4.109 142.9 -0.916*** 0.0125*** 0.0057*** 
 
(36.95) (94.02) (0.294) (0.002) (0.001) 
Post baseline -10.82 54.38 0.620*** -0.0110*** -0.0036*** 
 
(21.11) (53.86) (0.175) (0.001) (0.000) 
HELOC*post -1,017*** -1,017*** -0.006 0.0182*** 0.0007* 
 
(49.48) (121.7) (0.272) (0.001) (0.000) 
CASH-OUT*post 251.0*** -404.6*** -1.101*** 0.0298*** 0.0141*** 
 
(49.53) (139.3) (0.333) (0.002) (0.001) 
HELOAN*post -1,031*** -2,581*** 1.825*** 0.0132*** 0.0042*** 
 
(57.59) (160.9) (0.383) (0.002) (0.001) 
HECM*post -3,352*** -1,164*** 4.886*** -0.0133*** -0.0001 
 
(88.17) (134.5) (0.491) (0.003) (0.000) 
HELOC*prior -572.0*** -154.6 1.870*** 0.0028* 0.0018*** 
 
(55.29) (139.4) (0.299) (0.002) (0.000) 
CASH-OUT*prior 856.5*** 1,660*** 1.380*** 0.0026 0.0003 
 
(68.28) (204.5) (0.382) (0.002) (0.001) 
HELOAN*prior -80.17 2,368*** 4.262*** -0.0194*** -0.0093*** 
 
(70.02) (221.5) (0.457) (0.003) (0.001) 
HECM*prior -1,937*** 1,309*** 14.895*** -0.0559*** 0.0089*** 
 
(104.8) (226.1) (0.720) (0.005) (0.001) 
Constant 14,990 4,334 529.442*** -0.5235 -0.2819* 
 
(14,078) (26,448) (92.911) (0.609) (0.146) 
Observations 741,308 741,308 741,343 741,308 741,308 
R-squared 0.022 0.010 0.006 0.002 0.005 
Number of individuals 157,680 157,680 157,680 157,680 157,680 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; all models are estimated with individual fixed effects and age 
and year indicators (not shown) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 presents the results of the regression that includes channel interactions for each 
post period, allowing for nonlinearities over time.  If the coefficient is the same for the first 
through third years after extraction, this indicates that the impact of extraction on the outcome 
occurs in the first year and persists (but does not increase or decrease) over time. By contrast, if 
the coefficient is larger (smaller) in subsequent periods, this indicates that the effect grows 
(declines) over time. 
For most of the outcomes and extraction channels, the majority of the impact on a given 
outcome occurs in the first year.  For HECMs, the largest reductions in revolving and installment 
debts occur in the first year, and persist for the following two years. The impact on credit score is 
the greatest in the second year after extraction, and then declines slightly thereafter. For non-
HECM channels, the rate of default on trade-lines and foreclosure increases each year after 
extraction.  By the third year after extraction, only the HECM extractors are not significantly 
more likely to experience a foreclosure relative to nonextractors.  
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Table 5: Differences-in-Differences, Full Sample, By Period Post Extraction 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Open Credit 
Card Balance 
Open Installment 
Balance 
Equifax 
Risk Score 
Past Due 
(any) Foreclosure 
HELOC*post y1 -1,260*** -1,251*** -0.306 0.0097*** 0.0000 
 
(50.10) (119.6) (0.264) (0.001) (0.000) 
HELOC*post y2 -1,001*** -967.3*** 0.980*** 0.0196*** 0.0006 
 
(54.22) (138.3) (0.316) (0.002) (0.000) 
HELOC*post y3 -781.0*** -821.5*** -0.694** 0.0252*** 0.0015*** 
 
(59.14) (146.9) (0.349) (0.002) (0.001) 
CASH-OUT*post y1 280.9*** -207.0 -0.811** 0.0239*** 0.0066*** 
 
(48.06) (135.4) (0.325) (0.002) (0.001) 
CASH-OUT*post y2 291.5*** -417.0** -1.066*** 0.0347*** 0.0157*** 
 
(56.93) (162.6) (0.397) (0.002) (0.001) 
CASH-OUT*post y3 176.8*** -599.8*** -1.454*** 0.0307*** 0.0205*** 
 
(61.80) (173.2) (0.419) (0.002) (0.001) 
HELOAN*post y1 -1,053*** -2,684*** 2.008*** 0.0077*** 0.0035*** 
 
(57.04) (151.6) (0.368) (0.002) (0.001) 
HELOAN*post y2 -1,011*** -2,594*** 2.173*** 0.0146*** 0.0040*** 
 
(63.86) (177.7) (0.444) (0.003) (0.001) 
HELOAN*post y3 -1,030*** -2,459*** 1.271*** 0.0172*** 0.0053*** 
 
(68.50) (189.0) (0.488) (0.003) (0.001) 
HECM*post y1 -3,401*** -1,093*** 4.231*** -0.0282*** -0.0003 
 
(86.82) (121.0) (0.465) (0.003) (0.001) 
HECM*post y2 -3,385*** -1,118*** 6.170*** -0.0107*** -0.0002 
 
(94.25) (148.1) (0.573) (0.004) (0.001) 
HECM*post y3 -3,278*** -1,314*** 4.188*** 0.0005 0.0002 
 
(100.7) (171.9) (0.651) (0.004) (0.001) 
Constant 24,311 7,517 515.284*** 0.6533 -0.2976 
 
(15,043) (30,909) (105.263) (0.673) (0.192) 
      Observations 741,308 741,308 741,343 741,308 741,308 
R-squared 0.022 0.010 0.006 0.003 0.005 
Number of individuals 157,680 157,680 157,680 157,680 157,680 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; all models are estimated with individual fixed effects, age and year 
indicators, and indicators for the post periods and indicators for the prior period and their interactions by 
channel (not shown) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Credit Shock Subsample Regressions 
We next explore subsample regressions based on the presence of a prior credit shock, 
defined as a drop in credit score of 25 points or more in the two years prior to the baseline 
period. Table 6 presents the results of the primary model specification (Equation 1) for the 
subsample of seniors who had a prior credit shock (23,485 individuals), while Table 7 presents 
the results for the subsample without a prior credit shock (111,617 individuals).   
In comparing the results for the two subsamples, there is a generally larger reduction in 
debt balances for all extraction channels for those with a prior shock (Table 6). This is expected 
to the extent that those who needed liquidity turned to credit card debt prior to equity extraction, 
and then paid off the debt and borrowed from home equity after extraction. The negative 
coefficient for revolving debt on the CHANNEL*before for those with a shock suggests this 
might be the case—as the revolving debt balances were higher at baseline relative to two years 
prior for each extraction channel (credit card debt increased in the two years prior to extraction), 
then decreased after extraction. With regard to HECMs, the results indicate that a majority of the 
impact on debt reduction and credit score is for those who had a prior shock (Table 6).  There is 
still some debt reduction for those without a shock (Table 7), but no significant impact on credit 
score or default. 
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Table 6: Differences-in-Differences, Full Sample, Credit Shock 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Open Credit 
Card Balance 
Open Installment 
Balance 
Equifax 
Risk Score 
Past Due 
(any) Foreclosure 
            
Prior to baseline (2 yrs) -894.5*** 179.2 77.234*** -0.1971*** -0.0056** 
 
(134.5) (305.1) (0.892) (0.006) (0.002) 
Post baseline -392.6*** -175.3 12.196*** -0.0585*** -0.0022 
 
(74.76) (176.0) (0.620) (0.004) (0.002) 
HELOC*post -2,190*** -476.3 -3.283*** 0.0521*** -0.0021 
 
(185.9) (388.1) (1.020) (0.006) (0.002) 
CASH-OUT*post -1,024*** -872.2** -0.827 0.0372*** 0.0263*** 
 
(156.5) (392.1) (1.135) (0.008) (0.003) 
HELOAN*post -2,553*** -3,178*** 6.651*** -0.0182** 0.0032 
 
(188.4) (405.8) (1.334) (0.009) (0.004) 
HECM*post -5,333*** -1,627*** 7.187*** -0.0451*** -0.0023 
 
(203.1) (310.7) (1.140) (0.009) (0.002) 
HELOC*prior -4,290*** -1,269*** -18.078*** 0.1473*** 0.0157*** 
 
(189.5) (479.2) (0.775) (0.007) (0.002) 
CASH-OUT*prior -1,588*** 536.9 -6.024*** 0.0418*** 0.0062** 
 
(197.4) (534.6) (0.958) (0.008) (0.003) 
HELOAN*prior -1,672*** 4,084*** 5.313*** -0.0430*** -0.0370*** 
 
(230.7) (640.9) (1.223) (0.010) (0.005) 
HECM*prior -3,539*** 1,452*** 18.766*** -0.1411*** 0.0209*** 
 
(262.2) (490.6) (1.244) (0.011) (0.002) 
Constant 126,292*** 745.8 -175.966 1.1185 -0.2329 
 
(36,535) (59,245) (171.332) (1.372) (0.299) 
      Observations 108,872 108,872 108,880 108,872 108,872 
R-squared 0.071 0.020 0.291 0.082 0.020 
Number of individuals 23,485 23,485 23,485 23,485 23,485 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; all models are estimated with individual fixed effects and age and 
year indicators (not shown) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Differences-in-Differences, Full Sample, No Credit Shock 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Open Credit 
Card 
Balance 
Open 
Installment 
Balance 
Equifax Risk 
Score 
Past Due 
(any) Foreclosure 
            
Prior to baseline (2 yrs) 187.8*** 163.9* -16.080*** 0.0531*** 0.0076*** 
 
(37.22) (98.53) (0.277) (0.002) (0.001) 
Post baseline 56.18** 122.3** -1.737*** -0.0024** -0.0035*** 
 
(22.20) (58.01) (0.186) (0.001) (0.000) 
HELOC*post -843.0*** -1,157*** 0.689** 0.0128*** 0.0013*** 
 
(53.52) (139.2) (0.293) (0.001) (0.000) 
CASH-OUT*post 567.6*** -221.8 -1.419*** 0.0282*** 0.0114*** 
 
(56.15) (160.7) (0.365) (0.002) (0.001) 
HELOAN*post -637.8*** -2,496*** -0.143 0.0246*** 0.0038*** 
 
(63.58) (193.1) (0.407) (0.002) (0.001) 
HECM*post -2,335*** -838.8*** 0.155 0.0102*** -0.0000 
 
(94.13) (151.4) (0.518) (0.003) (0.000) 
HELOC*prior 23.67 -3.270 5.915*** -0.0230*** -0.0004 
 
(54.01) (142.0) (0.228) (0.002) (0.000) 
CASH-OUT*prior 1,421*** 1,932*** 0.455 0.0014 -0.0005 
 
(71.96) (222.3) (0.288) (0.002) (0.001) 
HELOAN*prior 317.0*** 1,839*** 0.261 -0.0007 -0.0023*** 
 
(67.89) (232.6) (0.313) (0.002) (0.001) 
HECM*prior -1,294*** 1,057*** -3.301*** 0.0293*** 0.0079*** 
 
(103.0) (254.2) (0.529) (0.005) (0.001) 
Constant -15,373 20,790 1,047.993*** -2.3945*** -0.3426** 
 
(14,114) (29,661) (86.108) (0.618) (0.174) 
      Observations 534,938 534,938 534,956 534,938 534,938 
R-squared 0.019 0.009 0.044 0.009 0.003 
Number of individuals 111,617 111,617 111,617 111,617 111,617 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; all models are estimated with individual fixed effects and age and year 
indicators (not shown) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Matched Sample Regression Results 
Table 8 presents the overall results of the matched sample regressions. Recall that the 
purpose of the matched sample is to identify the channel effect on credit outcomes, holding 
constant the characteristics of borrowers who select into different channels.  The matched sample 
results continue to show a drop in credit card balances for HECM borrowers of about $3,000; a 
decline that is larger relative to other channels of extraction.  However, HECM borrowers in the 
matched sample have declining credit scores post-extraction relative to non-borrowers and other 
extractors and have significantly higher rates of delinquency on debt payments relative to non-
borrowers. This suggests that the improvements in credit score and payment patterns observed in 
the full sample (Table 4) may be due to characteristics of borrowers that select into the HECM 
channel, rather than an effect of the HECM itself. Foreclosure rates for HECM borrowers in the 
matched sample are significantly lower than non-borrowers, this being similar to the results for 
the full sample.21   
  
                                                        
21 While extractors (other than HECM borrowers) in the full sample tend to be more likely to foreclose 
than non-borrowers in the full sample, we see that the sign switches for extractors in the matched sample, 
where HECM and HELOC borrowers are significantly less likely to foreclose post-extraction than non-
borrowers. This “sign switching” is in part because the non-borrowers in the matched sample regression 
are much more likely to have had a mortgage in the baseline period (one of the matching criteria) and thus 
be vulnerable to foreclosure than non-borrowers in the full sample. 
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Table 8: Differences-in-Differences, CEM Sample, Overall Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Open Credit 
Card 
Balance 
Open 
Installment 
Balance 
Equifax Risk 
Score 
Past Due 
(any) Foreclosure 
            
Prior to baseline (2 yrs) 222.3 773.1** 0.847 0.0049 0.0011 
 
(168.4) (381.9) (1.204) (0.008) (0.003) 
Post baseline -507.1*** 81.00 0.059 -0.0127*** 0.0041** 
 
(93.96) (257.0) (0.722) (0.005) (0.002) 
HELOC*post -563.7*** -503.2 -0.285 0.0127* -0.0092*** 
 
(214.3) (530.3) (1.215) (0.007) (0.002) 
CASH-OUT*post 802.9*** -681.9 1.128 0.0172** -0.0050 
 
(178.6) (591.1) (1.343) (0.008) (0.004) 
HELOAN*post -680.4*** -1,008** 3.066* 0.0158 -0.0054 
 
(231.9) (464.0) (1.657) (0.010) (0.004) 
HECM*post -3,042*** -852.8*** -2.509*** 0.0216*** -0.0103*** 
 
(159.3) (279.6) (0.908) (0.006) (0.002) 
HELOC*prior -582.6** -1,024* -1.558 0.0231*** 0.0134*** 
 
(259.2) (564.5) (1.355) (0.008) (0.002) 
CASH-OUT*prior 800.7*** -619.1 -2.148 0.0336*** 0.0044 
 
(243.8) (840.9) (1.554) (0.010) (0.004) 
HELOAN*prior -440.1 4,163*** 1.999 0.0078 -0.0095* 
 
(283.8) (808.8) (2.031) (0.012) (0.006) 
HECM*prior -2,371*** -292.7 4.321*** 0.0117 0.0156*** 
 
(184.2) (406.5) (1.199) (0.008) (0.002) 
Constant 29,574 57,418 789.750*** -1.9154** -0.5812*** 
 
(21,356) (40,574) (123.814) (0.776) (0.135) 
      Observations 72,932 72,932 72,189 72,932 72,932 
R-squared 0.044 0.011 0.005 0.003 0.009 
Number of individuals 15,311 15,311 15,311 15,311 15,311 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; all models are estimated with individual fixed effects and age and year 
indicators (not shown) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9 presents the results of the specifications that include the initial extraction 
amounts by channel and the amount of monthly cash available to HECM borrowers post 
extraction. With regard to credit card balances, an increase in the initial extraction amount is 
associated with a decrease in the balance for HECM and HELOAN borrowers.  For example, a 
HECM extraction of $10,000 at origination is associated with a $2,364 reduction in credit card 
balances in the first year, with the marginal effect being an additional $166 decrease in the credit 
card balance per $10,000 increase in the initial withdrawal amount. In addition, for each $100 
increase in the monthly cash amount from the HECM loan, credit card balances decline by about 
$45 in the first year after extraction, an effect that persists through the second year and begins to 
decline by the third year.  
For a HELOC extraction of $10,000 at origination, the decline in credit card balance is 
$720 in the first year, but we find no effect of additional withdrawal amounts. Further, the $720 
decline falls over time, being not different than 0 by the third year. The reduction in credit card 
debt of a cash-out refinancing withdrawal of $10,000 is about $500, this persisting over time. 
There is no marginal effect of higher withdrawals in the first year and only a small effect in the 
second year after origination.  For HELOANs, the change in credit card debt is very small in all 
three years after origination.     
With regard to installment loan balances, an increase in the extraction amount for 
HELOAN borrowers is associated with reduced balances by the third year after extraction; for 
HECM borrowers, balances are modestly lower in the first year after extraction corresponding to 
an increase in the extraction amount, but this does not persist beyond the first year. Few of the 
interactions for initial extraction amounts are significant for credit score, payment delinquencies, 
or foreclosures. An exception is cash-out refinance borrowers, where an increase in the initial 
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withdrawal amount is associated with a decline in credit score and an increase in the probability 
of being past due on debt payments.   
Table 9: Differences-in-Differences, CEM Sample, Extraction Amounts by Period 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Open Credit 
Card 
Balance 
Open 
Installment 
Balance 
Equifax 
Risk Score 
Past Due 
(any) Foreclosure 
HELOC*$ post y1 -23.45 -165.5 -0.108 0.0013 0.0003 
 
(36.53) (207.8) (0.191) (0.001) (0.001) 
HELOC*$ post y2 -39.57 -261.6 -0.123 0.0007 0.0007 
 
(35.50) (199.8) (0.235) (0.001) (0.001) 
HELOC*$ post y3 -23.69 -550.8*** -0.268 0.0011 0.0009 
 
(40.25) (208.2) (0.205) (0.001) (0.001) 
CASH-OUT*$ post y1 18.77 -78.26 -0.425*** 0.0023** 0.0002 
 
(23.63) (105.7) (0.147) (0.001) (0.000) 
CASH-OUT*$ post y2 66.29** -51.35 -0.615*** 0.0020* 0.0009 
 
(30.54) (101.0) (0.179) (0.001) (0.001) 
CASH-OUT*$ post y3 43.60 32.13 -0.695*** 0.0021* 0.0010 
 
(26.72) (124.6) (0.196) (0.001) (0.001) 
HELOAN*$ post y1 -73.96* -70.18 -0.108 0.0014 0.0003 
 
(39.34) (193.7) (0.331) (0.002) (0.001) 
HELOAN*$ post y2 -100.7** -35.97 0.081 0.0001 0.0002 
 
(42.56) (203.0) (0.316) (0.002) (0.001) 
HELOAN*$ post y3 -112.0** -235.4** 0.039 -0.0022 -0.0004 
 
(50.72) (118.5) (0.343) (0.002) (0.002) 
HECM*$ post y1 -165.9*** -107.5** 0.065 -0.0016** 0.0001 
 
(29.50) (51.86) (0.134) (0.001) (0.000) 
HECM*$ post y2 -127.7*** -73.77 -0.031 -0.0006 0.0002 
 
(32.28) (55.47) (0.144) (0.001) (0.000) 
HECM*$ post y3 -126.2*** -72.94 -0.036 -0.0011 -0.0001 
 
(34.34) (64.31) (0.167) (0.001) (0.000) 
HELOC*post y1 -719.6*** -588.2 0.724 -0.0017 -0.0076*** 
 
(226.6) (620.7) (1.266) (0.007) (0.002) 
HELOC*post y2 -453.7* 122.9 0.871 0.0082 -0.0116*** 
 
(251.1) (656.0) (1.568) (0.009) (0.003) 
HELOC*post y3 -285.9 1,684** -0.863 0.0225** -0.0143*** 
 
(273.1) (816.9) (1.595) (0.010) (0.003) 
CASH-OUT*post y1 549.7*** -108.0 4.450*** -0.0061 -0.0078* 
 
(202.8) (769.4) (1.507) (0.011) (0.004) 
CASH-OUT*post y2 564.4** -565.3 4.871** 0.0144 -0.0090* 
 
(247.7) (918.8) (1.979) (0.013) (0.005) 
CASH-OUT*post y3 568.1** -842.3 4.013* 0.0064 -0.0100 
 
(260.3) (1,042) (2.133) (0.013) (0.006) 
HELOAN*post y1 -360.2 -1,141 3.066 0.0077 -0.0018 
 
(267.7) (889.4) (1.965) (0.012) (0.006) 
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HELOAN*post y2 -377.8 -739.4 3.610 0.0069 -0.0058 
 
(301.7) (951.5) (2.295) (0.014) (0.006) 
HELOAN*post y3 -291.3 34.19 2.706 0.0355** -0.0093 
 
(340.1) (676.6) (2.499) (0.016) (0.008) 
HECM*post y1 -2,198*** -217.6 0.181 0.0094 -0.0068*** 
 
(240.3) (545.8) (1.396) (0.009) (0.002) 
HECM*post y2 -2,096*** -10.28 0.487 0.0116 -0.0115*** 
 
(261.6) (570.4) (1.603) (0.010) (0.002) 
HECM*post y3 -2,010*** -222.7 -2.392 0.0366*** -0.0138*** 
 
(286.3) (597.4) (1.784) (0.011) (0.003) 
HECM monthly cash*post y1 -45.18** -43.16 -0.319*** 0.0007 0.0000 
 
(22.19) (52.61) (0.112) (0.001) (0.000) 
HECM monthly cash*post y2 -60.40** -69.64 -0.193 0.0014* 0.0000 
 
(23.92) (57.24) (0.124) (0.001) (0.000) 
HECM monthly cash*post y3 -43.07 -71.38 -0.251* 0.0007 0.0000 
 
(27.61) (61.13) (0.141) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant -15,434 -31,801 947.655*** -1.8117 -2.3403** 
 
(37,225) (141,011) (269.741) (1.573) (0.984) 
      Observations 72,932 72,932 72,189 72,932 72,932 
R-squared 0.046 0.013 0.006 0.004 0.011 
Number of individuals 15,311 15,311 15,311 15,311 15,311 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; all models are estimated with individual fixed effects, age and year indicators, 
and indicators for the post periods and indicators for the prior period and their interactions by channel (not shown) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
Matched Subsample Regressions by Initial Withdrawal Amount 
Our last set of specifications estimates subsample regressions with the matched sample 
based on the amount of the initial withdrawal, placing extractors into three groups: small, with 
initial withdrawals of less than $10,000; medium, with initial withdrawals between $10,000 and 
$50,000; and large, with initial withdrawals of greater than $50,000. Nonextractors are included 
as the reference group for all of the subsamples. We estimate the period regressions, including 
each year post extraction interacted with the channel of extraction. We also include the HECM 
monthly cash amount for each period post extraction. While the full model is estimated as 
specified in equation (1), we report only the coefficients for the channel and post period 
interactions, and the HECM monthly cash amount interactions by post period. The results are 
grouped by outcome and withdrawal amount in Table 10. 
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Table 10: Differences-in-Differences, CEM Sample, Results by Initial Withdrawal Amount 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Open Credit Card Balance Open Installment Balance 
  
Withdrawa
l <$10k 
Withdrawa
l $10k-$50k 
Withdrawa
l >$50k  
Withdrawa
l <$10k 
Withdrawa
l $10k-$50k 
Withdrawa
l >$50k  
HELOC*post y1 314.7 -1,061*** -1,971*** -403.6 -1,332** -1,563 
 
(296.8) (287.3) (661.8) (507.6) (529.5) (2,821) 
HELOC*post y2 763.7** -935.8*** -1,913*** -181.8 -310.3 -2,456 
 
(337.1) (317.4) (643.1) (615.1) (630.0) (1,941) 
HELOC*post y3 1,066*** -949.5*** -1,224 877.4 318.8 -1,907 
 
(348.5) (346.0) (807.4) (685.7) (1,040) (2,363) 
CASH-OUT*post y1 217.8 518.1** 1,018*** -163.4 -1,121 116.8 
 
(230.9) (235.0) (297.9) (475.0) (743.7) (1,002) 
CASH-OUT*post y2 201.1 635.7** 1,687*** 137.8 -1,510 -321.6 
 
(289.7) (285.4) (351.0) (886.7) (991.6) (1,258) 
CASH-OUT*post y3 54.29 582.4* 1,461*** 274.1 -1,282 -112.3 
 
(355.4) (303.7) (366.2) (888.9) (1,073) (1,319) 
HELOAN*post y1 638.4* -790.2*** -953.5** -823.6 -1,034* -2,843** 
 
(387.7) (297.7) (432.1) (821.3) (549.3) (1,116) 
HELOAN*post y2 615.9 -799.7** -1,392** 94.90 -572.4 -2,254* 
 
(417.1) (339.8) (541.4) (1,014) (630.5) (1,317) 
HELOAN*post y3 898.8* -808.0** -1,371** 1,111 -652.2 -2,304* 
 
(514.0) (361.3) (594.5) (1,129) (630.5) (1,360) 
HECM*post y1 -778.6** -2,662*** -4,922*** -1,714** -453.8 -81.50 
 
(375.5) (303.7) (446.9) (824.5) (407.7) (1,212) 
HECM*post y2 -893.9** -2,300*** -4,510*** -1,363* -28.07 345.2 
 
(418.9) (318.9) (475.8) (816.6) (500.9) (1,256) 
HECM*post y3 -926.4* -2,350*** -4,076*** -1,395* -10.67 -27.65 
 
(473.1) (347.5) (497.9) (811.5) (563.1) (1,399) 
HECM monthly cash*post 
y1 -89.44** -56.32 -15.33 29.22 -6.846 -142.0 
 
(36.03) (36.37) (44.75) (68.58) (43.11) (139.8) 
HECM monthly cash*post 
y2 -104.7*** -78.15** -14.67 -19.46 -64.42 -113.1 
 
(39.39) (39.60) (48.18) (66.45) (72.54) (147.1) 
HECM monthly cash*post 
y3 -62.81 -58.36 -32.17 -66.36 -52.59 -64.54 
 
(47.48) (44.98) (53.18) (66.71) (81.13) (163.0) 
Constant 57,705 -31,823 92,880* 211,890** -62,400 162,001 
 
(50,826) (47,942) (54,212) (99,654) (175,648) (116,992) 
 
  
 
  
   Observations 37,992 49,427 38,506 37,992 49,427 38,506 
R-squared 0.024 0.040 0.049 0.009 0.009 0.013 
Number of individuals 7,841 10,313 7,990 7,841 10,313 7,990 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; all models are estimated with individual fixed effects, age and year 
indicators, and indicators for the post periods and indicators for the prior period and their interactions by channel 
(not shown) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10 (cont.):  Difference-in-Difference, CEM Sample,  
Results by Initial Withdrawal Amount 
   (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 
Equifax Risk Score Past Due (any) Foreclosure 
  
Withdrawal 
<$10k 
Withdrawal 
$10k-$50k 
Withdrawal 
>$50k 
Withdrawal 
<$10k 
Withdrawal 
$10k-$50k 
Withdrawal 
>$50k 
Withdrawal 
<$10k 
Withdrawal 
$10k-$50k 
Withdrawal 
>$50k 
HELOC*post y1 -0.241 1.060 -0.717 0.0030 -0.0020 0.0155 -0.0065*** -0.0069*** -0.0065*** 
 
(1.742) (1.590) (3.198) (0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
HELOC*post y2 -0.031 0.426 1.340 0.0043 0.0118 0.0192 -0.0095*** -0.0104*** -0.0068 
 
(2.089) (2.007) (3.419) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
HELOC*post y3 -1.044 -2.497 -0.867 0.0249* 0.0288** 0.0206 -0.0137*** -0.0115*** -0.0094* 
 
(2.173) (2.083) (3.260) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
CASH-OUT*post y1 10.828*** 4.043** -4.780** -0.0172 -0.0052 0.0350*** -0.0144* -0.0127** 0.0060 
 
(3.145) (1.609) (2.046) (0.025) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
CASH-OUT*post y2 10.196** 4.111* -6.509*** 0.0026 0.0163 0.0492*** -0.0060 -0.0120** 0.0085 
 
(4.101) (2.171) (2.322) (0.031) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
CASH-OUT*post y3 8.044* 3.077 -7.812*** -0.0108 0.0125 0.0391*** -0.0253** -0.0036 0.0044 
 
(4.513) (2.317) (2.456) (0.032) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) 
HELOAN*post y1 2.607 2.885 1.717 0.0083 0.0131 0.0156 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0014 
 
(3.796) (1.937) (3.161) (0.026) (0.013) (0.019) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
HELOAN*post y2 11.517*** 1.442 5.779 -0.0206 0.0182 -0.0060 -0.0085 -0.0032 -0.0087 
 
(4.312) (2.466) (3.826) (0.025) (0.015) (0.021) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) 
HELOAN*post y3 7.523* 0.237 7.215* 0.0083 0.0473*** -0.0189 -0.0037 -0.0034 -0.0372*** 
 
(4.511) (2.702) (4.148) (0.029) (0.016) (0.024) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) 
HECM*post y1 -4.701** 1.014 2.910 0.0298* -0.0057 -0.0064 -0.0058 -0.0062*** -0.0079*** 
 
(2.124) (1.729) (2.262) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
HECM*post y2 -1.883 0.336 1.517 0.0205 0.0110 -0.0009 -0.0093* -0.0116*** -0.0107*** 
 
(2.445) (2.028) (2.545) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
HECM*post y3 -4.276 -1.624 -3.288 0.0329* 0.0323** 0.0294 -0.0125** -0.0143*** -0.0158*** 
 
(2.790) (2.246) (2.934) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) 
HECM monthly cash*post y1 -0.325* -0.182 -0.281 0.0003 0.0009 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001** 
 
(0.187) (0.167) (0.229) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
HECM monthly cash*post y2 -0.333 -0.044 -0.099 0.0018 0.0007 0.0013 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 
 
(0.210) (0.192) (0.247) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
HECM monthly cash*post y3 -0.414* -0.136 -0.081 0.0010 0.0012 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001* 
 
(0.241) (0.225) (0.274) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 992.615** 869.784** 1,147.100*** -0.9892 -1.5373 -1.9065 -3.7502** -2.6351** -2.8903* 
 
(393.552) (343.689) (404.748) (2.638) (2.011) (2.604) (1.579) (1.224) (1.524) 
 
  
 
    
 
  
   Observations 37,824 49,093 38,265 37,992 49,427 38,506 37,992 49,427 38,506 
R-squared 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.013 0.012 0.014 
Number of individuals 7,841 10,313 7,990 7,841 10,313 7,990 7,841 10,313 7,990 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; all models are estimated with individual fixed effects, age and year indicators, and indicators for the 
post periods and indicators for the prior period and their interactions by channel (not shown) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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With regard to credit card balances, the amount of the decline in the balance post 
extraction appears to be correlated to the initial withdrawal amount. The decline greatest for 
those making large initial withdrawals, and in particular for HECM borrowers making large 
initial withdrawals where the balance declines by nearly $5,000 in the first year post extraction 
(which is the period with the largest decline). For HECM borrowers making small initial 
withdrawals, the decline in credit card balances is more modest at about $800 in the first year 
post extraction. However, the monthly cash from the HECM has a larger effect on credit card 
balances for borrowers making small initial withdrawals, where a $100 increase in the monthly 
cash amount is associated with about $90 less in credit card balances in the first year after 
extraction. For HECM borrowers with large initial withdrawals, there is no significant impact of 
the amount of monthly cash from the HECM on credit card balances.  
The differences in the change in debt balances by extraction amount for HECM 
borrowers make sense, given the constraint that HECM borrowers must pay off existing 
mortgages prior to originating the HECM loan. Holding discretionary withdrawal amounts 
constant, HECM borrowers who had a prior mortgage (or larger prior mortgage balances) will 
have less money available to withdraw at origination and will have a greater increase in monthly 
cash flow from the HECM (due to the foregone mortgage payments) than those without a prior 
mortgage (or with smaller balances).  
For other extraction channels, borrowers with small initial withdrawals either have no 
significant decline in credit card balances or observe an increase in credit card balances post-
extraction. HELOC and HELOAN borrowers making large initial withdraws have a decline in 
credit card balances of about $2,000 and $1,000 respectively in the first year post extraction. 
Cash-out refinance borrowers making large initial withdrawals have a significant increase in 
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their credit card balances post-extraction—an increase of about $1,000 in the year post extraction 
that continues (and increases slightly) through the third year.   
The amount of the initial withdrawal amount also moderates trends observed for 
installment debt by channel.  HECM borrowers making small initial withdrawals have the 
greatest reduction installment debt post-extraction, with no significant change for those HECM 
borrowers making large initial withdrawals. The amount of monthly cash from the HECM is not 
significantly associated with changes in installment debt amounts across any of the initial 
withdrawal amount categories. For other channels of extraction, a reduction in installment debt is 
only consistently observed for HELOAN borrowers with large initial withdrawals.  
Table 11 reports the regression results for credit score, delinquencies on debt payments, 
and foreclosure by initial withdrawal amount subsample. With regard to credit score, the biggest 
difference by withdrawal amount is observed for cash-out refinance borrowers. Cash-out 
refinance borrowers with small initial withdrawal amounts have a significant increase in credit 
score post extraction (about 10 points), whereas cash-out refinance borrowers with large initial 
withdrawal amounts have a decline in credit score post extraction (about five  points).  A similar 
trend in payment delinquencies is observed for cash-out refinance borrowers making large initial 
withdrawals—they are significantly more likely to be 60 or more days late on a debt payment in 
the years following extraction (3.5 to 5 percentage points) than nonborrowers.  There is no 
significant change in the probability of debt payment delinquency post-extraction for other 
channels of borrowers with large initial withdrawals. By contrast, HECM borrowers with small 
initial withdrawals have an increase probability of being late on debt payments in the three years 
following extraction, a trend that is not observed for HECM borrowers making large initial 
withdrawals.  With regard to foreclosures, HELOC, cash-out, and HECM borrowers making 
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small initial withdrawals are less likely to experience foreclosure by the third year post-
extraction than nonborrowers, a trend that continues for HELOC and HECM borrowers making 
large initial withdrawals. However, cash-out refinance borrowers with large initial withdrawals 
have no significant change in the probability of foreclosure relative to non-borrowers.    
Conclusions 
The findings from this study help inform the relationship between equity extraction and 
credit outcomes of senior households.  Prior studies have theoretically and empirically examined 
conditions under which senior households are more likely to spend down home equity during 
retirement.  However, less is known about what happens to seniors after they make the decision 
to extract home equity.  Using a differences-in-differences approach, we compare the credit 
trajectories for seniors extracting equity through various borrowing channels, including a reverse 
mortgage, relative to the credit trajectories for seniors not originating an equity extraction loan.   
A primary takeaway from our analysis is that different borrowing channels are associated 
with very different credit trajectories, both prior to and after extraction. Prior to extraction, 
seniors extracting through a HECM were much more likely to have had a credit shock: nearly 30 
percent of HECM borrowers experienced a shock two years prior to origination, compared to 15 
percent of other extractors. Across all channels of extraction, seniors with a credit shock who 
extract equity demonstrate an increase in credit card balances prior to extraction that 
subsequently decline post extraction. This is in line with households turning to credit cards for 
liquidity in the short term before turning to their home equity.  To the extent that HECMs and 
other types of mortgages have lower interest rates and fees than credit card borrowing, this type 
of substitution may be associated with improved financial position over the longer term. Future 
analyses could estimate these impacts. 
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One of the hypothesized reasons that senior homeowners do not spend down housing 
wealth is that they want to preserve home equity as precautionary savings, in case of a future 
shock (e.g., Megbolugbe, Sa-Aadu, and Shilling, 1997; Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 2010). 
However, in order to extract equity through borrowing, the senior homeowner must be able to 
qualify for and afford a mortgage. In contrast to HECMs, forward channels of equity extraction 
have stringent credit based underwriting requirements that may prevent seniors experiencing a 
financial shock from tapping their equity through borrowing. The predominant form of equity 
extraction among seniors in our sample is borrowing through a HELOC. Our results indicate that 
HELOC borrowers tend to have strong credit profiles prior to extraction that remain strong post-
extraction. 
Post-extraction, there are noticeable differences in credit outcomes by extraction channel. 
While there is some decline in nonhousing debt across all borrowing channels, the decline is the 
greatest among seniors extracting equity through a HECM, and particularly for credit card debt.  
For example, our matched sample differences-in-differences estimates indicate that credit card 
balances for HECM borrowers decline by $3,000 more than nonextractors over the same period. 
Credit card balances for HELOC and HELOAN borrowers decline by only about $500 relative to 
nonextractors, and credit card balances increase post-extraction for cash-out refinance borrowers. 
Future research is needed to unpack the mechanisms by which the HECM impacts credit card 
balances. 
With regard to payment delinquencies, we find that all types of extractors have an 
increase in the probability of being 60 days or more late on a debt payment post extraction 
relative to nonborrowers in the matched sample. The results for foreclosure are more nuanced by 
channel, where cash-out and HELOAN borrowers tend to perform worse post-extraction, and 
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HELOC and HECM borrowers tend to perform relatively better.  To the extent that equity 
extraction increases total monthly debt payments, the household may be at greater risk of default 
on their mortgage, particularly if the senior experiences a shock to his or her income. Given that 
the HECM does not require a monthly payment, extracting equity through a HECM does not 
increase the monthly debt to income burden as it may for other channels of extraction.  
Relative to other borrowing channels, the HECM appears to play a unique role in 
providing seniors with access to equity through borrowing, particularly to help seniors recover 
from financial shocks. Historically, the HECM program has had no credit- or income-based 
underwriting criteria. However, increased rates of default on property taxes and homeowners 
insurance have led to significant policy changes since 2014, such as limitations on the initial 
withdrawal amount and changes to underwriting criteria to include consideration of credit history 
and income (Moulton, Haurin, and Shi, 2015b).  A policy challenge for the HECM program 
moving forward is to preserve program access to seniors who may be cut-off from other home 
equity borrowing channels, while minimizing the risk that borrowers will be unable to afford to 
maintain the home, including payment of property taxes and homeowners insurance. 
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Appendix A 
Supplemental Comparison of Financial Outcomes 
The primary analysis in this paper is the analysis of credit outcomes. However, we also 
include a supplemental analysis of changes in financial outcomes from survey data. The first 
source of data for this supplemental analysis is the Aging in Place (AIP) reverse mortgage 
survey, administered by the research team between July 1, 2014 and June 30, 2015. This survey 
includes information on financial indicators for a subset of about 1,100 HECM borrowers in the 
RMCP dataset, including income, financial assets, mortgage debt, and house values.22 We also 
have baseline information on income, mortgage debt, and house values for these same 
households from the data collected at the time of counseling. We limit the AIP survey sample to 
those HECM borrowers counseled between 2008 and 2011. The number of observations in the 
HECM sample changes slightly depending on the financial variable.  
We compare the financial indicators for HECM borrowers to financial indicators for 
seniors in the general population using HRS survey data. The HRS is a nationally representative 
biennial panel survey of more than 26,000 adults over the age of 50.  For our study, we use the 
“core” public dataset, including detailed information at the individual level on household 
financial characteristics.23 We limit the HRS sample to individuals residing in households where 
at least one member was age 62 or older as of the 2008 or 2010 survey wave and who were a 
homeowner at that time, and thus would have been eligible for a reverse mortgage.24 The 2008 
                                                        
22 For more information on the AIP survey, including the survey design and response rates, please see the 
complete survey report: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2749368   
23 Our analysis is at the household level. For questions asked of multiple household members, we use the 
responses of the primary respondent as coded in the HRS. If the primary respondent is under the age of 
62, we use responses for the household member who is age 62 or older. 
24 Approximately 75 percent of HRS households were homeowners as of the 2008 or 2010 survey wave.   
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and 2010 survey waves are comparable in time to the baseline period counseling period for our 
HECM borrowers.  
Within the HRS dataset, we identify households who extract equity through a forward 
mortgage after the 2008 or 2010 survey wave. To do this, we follow the same logic that we use 
with the CCP dataset. We code households in the HRS as home equity borrowers if they have an 
increase in their mortgage amount of 5 percent or more (or at least $1,000) from the 2008 or 
2010 waves of the HRS to the 2014 wave of the HRS, excluding those households who 
purchased a home or moved during the time period, or who were in foreclosure. We separate 
those who have an increase in their first and/or second mortgage balances (closed-end extractors) 
from those who have an increase in HELOC balances (HELOC extractors).  Using this logic, we 
identify 364 households in the HRS who extracted equity through cash-out refinancing and 338 
households in the HRS who extracted equity through a HELOC between the 2008/2010 wave 
and the 2014 wave of the HRS. We identify about 5,300 households who were homeowners age 
62 or older as of the 2008 or 2010 waves, but who did not extract additional home equity prior to 
the 2014 survey wave.     
Table A1 presents summary statistics for the financial indicators as of the baseline period. 
For HECM borrowers, the baseline period occurs at the time of counseling prior to the 
origination of the HECM loan, between the years 2008 and 2011.  For the HRS, we include 
respondents from both the 2008 and 2010 waves, so long as the household responded either in 
2008 or 2010 and the 2014 wave, has at least one household member aged 62 or older, and is a 
homeowner. This makes the timing of responses comparable between the HRS and HECM 
samples.  
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Table A1: Baseline Financial Characteristics 
  HECM Borrowers HRS HRS Closed-end extractors 
HRS HELOC 
extractors 
  Mean/Median N 
Mean/Median 
N 
Mean/Median 
N 
Mean/Median 
N 
Total household income 2,983 / 2,493 5,560*** / 3,844 7,356*** / 5,269 7,252*** / 5,315 
1,153 10,264 635 626 
    
Home value of primary 
residence 
309,925 / 248,850 245,328*** / 183,940 311,850 / 232,630 312,310 / 259,680 
1,217 10,329 646 629 
    
Mortgage debt for 
primary residence 
84,073 / 52,105 46,216*** / 0 127,966*** / 99,540 78,658 / 44,240 
1,216 10,328 646 629 
    
Home equity of primary 
residence 
226,101 / 176,960 199,043*** / 150,416 183,884*** / 125,512 233,653 / 176,366 
1,216 10,328 646 629 
    
Monthly mortgage 
payment  
700 / 483 376*** / 0 1,057*** / 920 762 / 691 
1,179 9,562 595 421 
    
The means columns show statistical significance of t-tests between HECM borrowers and the appropriate column; HECM 
borrowers include active and terminated. Means shown are weighted. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
 
As indicated on the table, HRS respondents have significantly higher incomes than 
HECM borrowers, with the median income of the HECM borrower of around $2,500 per month, 
relative to a median income of about $3,800 per month for a homeowner in the HRS. Those 
extracting equity through closed-end channels or HELOCs have even higher median incomes in 
the period prior to extraction—more than twice that of the HECM borrower (about $5,300 per 
month). Interestingly, the home values of the HECM borrowers are not significantly different 
from the average home values of seniors extracting equity through forward channels in the HRS- 
an average of about $300,000 across extraction channels (median of around $250,000). HECM 
borrowers tend to have significantly higher amounts of mortgage debt than other seniors in the 
HRS ($84,000 on average compared to $42,000),  but they have significantly less mortgage debt 
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and significantly more home equity than closed end extractors in the HRS, with no significant 
differences between HECM and HELOC extractors.   
Table A2 presents the summary statistics for the HECM borrowers as of the 2014/15 AIP 
survey, and for HRS respondents as of the 2014 wave of the HRS. Here, we also include an 
indicator of financial assets, as this is collected comparably between the two surveys. With 
regard to financial assets, the HECM borrowers have an average amount of about $61,000 
(median of only $10,000). Nonextracting homeowners in the HRS have a significantly higher 
average amount of about $185,000 (median of $49,000) in financial assets, with HELOC 
borrowers in the HRS having even higher asset amounts, and closed-end equity extractors having 
lower average and median asset levels. 
  
57 
Table A2: 2014 Financial Characteristics 
  HECM Borrowers HRS HRS Closed-end extractors 
HRS HELOC 
extractors 
  Mean/Median N 
Mean/Median 
N 
Mean/Median 
N 
Mean/Median 
N 
Total household 
income 
3,234 / 2,168 5,166*** / 3,553 7,379*** / 5,168 6,763*** / 4,876 
943 5,562 358 333 
        
Total 
nonhousing 
financial assets 
61,483 / 10,000 185,222*** / 49,000 153,432*** / 17,500 209,326*** / 75,000 
871 5,426 356 329 
        
Home value of 
primary 
residence  
266,676 / 200,000 198,479*** / 150,000 284,501 / 200,000 266,614 / 200,000 
992 5,587 362 336 
        
Mortgage debt 
for primary 
residence 
131,242 / 100,000 34,913*** / 0 154,663**   / 123,000 88,022*** / 50,000 
1,111 5,596 362 336 
        
Home equity of 
primary 
residence 
130,676 / 80,000 163,391*** / 120,000 129,839 / 75,000 178,592***/135,000 
986 5,586 362 336 
        
Monthly 
mortgage 
payment  
77 / 0 260*** / 0 1,022*** / 880 1,124*** / 1,000 
1,040 5,227 337 99 
        
The means columns show statistical significance of t-tests between HECM borrowers and the appropriate column; HECM 
borrowers include active and terminated. Means shown are weighted. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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We next estimate fixed effects differences-in-differences models, tracking the changes in 
home values, mortgage debt, home equity and the monthly mortgage payment amount. The 
model specification is similar to model (1) in the full period, but includes only two periods: the 
baseline period prior to extraction, corresponding to the 2008 or 2010 HRS survey wave or the 
time of counseling for HECM borrowers, and the period after extraction, corresponding to the 
2014 HRS survey wave and the 2014 RMCP survey. Specifically, we group HECM borrowers 
counseled in 2008 or 2009 with the 2008 HRS survey wave, and HECM borrowers counseled in 
2010 or 2011 with the 2010 HRS survey wave, and track changes from the baseline period to 
2014. Covariates include only those indicators that may change between survey waves, including 
age of the youngest household member and marital status. We include an interaction term for the 
channel of extraction and the post-period, this being the coefficient of interest for interpreting the 
channel effect on financial outcomes. Table A3 presents the results. 
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Table A3: Difference in Differences, Home Equity Extraction from Baseline to 2014 
  
Home value of primary 
residence Mortgage debt 
Home equity of primary 
residence Monthly mortgage payment 
  2008 to 2014 2010 to 2014 2008 to 2014 2010 to 2014 2008 to 2014 2010 to 2014 2008 to 2014 2010 to 2014 
Post Period (2014) -45,253*** -14,213*** -15,248*** -9,978*** -30,031*** -4,134 -79*** -61*** 
(6,452) (3,965) (3,034) (2,258) (6,884) (4,353) (28) (18) 
HECM*Post -14,239* -1,926 71,429*** 69,207*** -84,398*** -69,803*** -593*** -436*** 
(8,426) (4,271) (3,998) (2,436) (9,069) (4,696) (34) (19) 
Closed End HRS*Post -22,055*** -4,181 45,881*** 43,345*** -67,944*** -47,525*** 41 68** 
(8,523) (7,131) (4,008) (4,061) (9,093) (7,827) (36) (33) 
HELOC HRS*Post -12,839 -13,128* 28,942*** 26,795*** -41,785*** -39,925*** 19 64 
(7,812) (6,931) (3,673) (3,947) (8,334) (7,608) (62) (58) 
Age of youngest household 
member 
-298 -80 137 -245 -429 140 -4 -3 
(1,037) (993) (488) (566) (1,107) (1,090) (4) (5) 
Unmarried Male 3,894 -19,126* 2,188 -7,068 1,617 -12,129 21 6 
(10,256) (9,796) (4,823) (5,579) (10,943) (10,753) (44) (46) 
Unmarried Female 10,085 -679 5,314 2,700 4,672 -3,515 11 46 
(6,878) (7,476) (3,234) (4,258) (7,338) (8,206) (29) (34) 
Constant 262,104*** 231,381*** 26,784 60,287 234,908*** 172,860** 596* 520* 
(71,741) (69,331) (33,742) (39,486) (76,549) (76,105) (311) (314) 
                  
Observations 8,427 10,850 8,423 10,847 8,423 10,847 7,828 10,080 
R-squared 0.144 0.023 0.114 0.143 0.129 0.066 0.137 0.160 
Number of unique 
individuals 4,217 5,437 4,217 5,437 4,217 5,437 4,102 5,258 
Standard errors in parentheses; all specifications are individual fixed-effects regressions 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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With regard to housing values, the average senior homeowner in 2008 observed about a 
$45,000 decline in house value through 2014, and the change from 2010 to 2014 was more 
modest, at about $14,000.  Those extracting equity through closed end loans in 2008 saw a 
statistically significant greater decline in their home values than nonextractors in the sample. It 
could be that these seniors lived in areas with more volatile house prices with a steeper increase 
in house prices prior to 2008 (prompting extraction), followed by a steeper decline in prices post 
bust. Mortgage debt post extraction (in 2014) is a function of both the amount extracted and the 
change in the balance due to interest, fees and payments post extraction.  Not surprisingly, 
HECM borrowers see the greatest increase in their mortgage balances, followed by closed-end 
extractors and HELOC extractors.  The amount of home equity (home value less mortgage debt) 
declines for all extractors, but declines the most for HECM borrowers, then closed-end 
extractors, followed by HELOC borrowers. One of the stark differences between HECM 
borrowers relative to other home equity borrowers in the HRS is the change in the monthly 
mortgage payment. Recall that HECM borrowers must pay off any prior forward mortgages at 
the time of extraction, and then make no repayment of the HECM until loan termination. Based 
on the estimation results, this results in a $400 to $600 per month savings for HECM borrowers 
relative to senior homeowners who are non-borrowers in the HRS. By contrast, HELOC and 
closed-end extractors see a modest increase in their monthly mortgage payments, although this 
increase is only statistically significant for closed-end extractors in the 2010 HRS survey wave.  
